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This article tests the hypothesis that member states of the EU have been experiencing
a declining share of labour income due to technological advance. It discusses factors
that lead to the fall in the labour share, including technological advance, which is a
tendency found in the capitalist system. We also identify the undesirable effects of a
fall in the labour shares. The results of an econometric test conducted in our study,
based on a labour demand equation that was derived from the CES production func-
tion, confirm the hypothesis that technological progress negatively affected the labour
share of income, everything else remaining constant. This finding has important im-
plications for EU Member States, namely that some form of policy intervention would
seem to be necessary, as technological progress could lead to a continuing fall in the
share of labour income if left to its own devices.
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Introduction
During the past decade there has been a growing body of literature on technolog-
ical advance and labour share of national income. It has been observed that in
many countries the share of national income that is earned by labour, termed as
the labour share, has been declining over time, though the pace of the decline dif-
fers (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012; Stockhammer, 2012). This implies that the
share of capital income has become more prominent in the functional distribution
of national income. The labour compensation in national income has fallen in most
developed countries (OECD, 2012), while this decline is also observable in devel-
oping countries (ILO, 2012).
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In Europe, the decline in wage share is associated with technological advances1
that have contributed to lower labour demand (Jaumotte et al., 2013; Lawless and
Whelan, 2011), as we shall test in this article. This suggests that technological
improvements have been capital augmenting, which increases demand for capital
inputs and reduces demand for labour (Raurich et al. 2012; Checchi and Garcia-
Penalosa, 2010; European Commission, 2007; IMF, 2007; Bentolila and Saint-
Paul, 2003), and particularly low-skilled workers (Arpaia et al., 2009); such a
change leads to fewer workers producing a given output, and this in turn leads
to higher returns to capital owners, who generally have a stronger say than workers
in how to distribute income from increased productivity. Several studies explain
why and how technological change can be directed towards labour saving.2 Ace-
moglu (2003a, 2003b, 2002) shows that technology is capital-augmented, because
increases in wage rates invoke labour-saving technological change, which therefore
reduces the labour share. Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Elsby et al. (2013) also pro-
pose that decline in the labour share could be attributed to offshoring that is mostly
concentrated in the labour-intensive component of the supply chain. The asymmet-
rical power over the income distribution is another possible cause why the fruits of
technological advance are not shared equally between employees and employers.
The globalisation process is considered as another reason why the share of
labour has decreased. Athreye and Cantwell (2007) argue that technological ad-
vance has spread due to the emergence of new countries as contributors3 to tech-
nology generation in the world economy, and has deteriorated the bargaining power
of hired employees in most developed countries. Globalisation has opened trade in
most countries and this has been considered as an important factor affecting the
labour share of income, particularly if the competition by imports lowers the rela-
tive income of workers (Helpman et al., 2010; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
Another factor associated with globalisation is migration. Reed and Latorre
(2009) found that immigration tends to decrease wage rates, and according to Dust-
mann et al. (2013), and Nickell and Salaheen (2008), lower-paid workers are more
likely to experience this. In this regard, Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) note, however,
that a fall in average wage rates need not result in a falling share of labour, since
the latter depends on the labour demand wage elasticity.
Furthermore, the increasingly powerful forces of globalisation — namely, the
combination of intensified cross-border competition and global labour arbitrage —
have given rise to an increase in productivity (Roach, 2009). The globalisation
process may have led to various changes favouring capital owners, given that this
process may have been driven by powerful corporations. In addition, laws and
policies favouring the supply side of the economy, which lead to the erosion of
the power of labour unions, may also have led to a lower labour share (Lavoie and
Stockhammer, 2012; OECD, 2012; Storm and Naastepad, 2009; Atkinson et al.,
2009).
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Yet, another factor associated with globalisation is the greater influence of fi-
nancial institutions (Palley, 2011). Lawless and Whelan (2011) estimated the im-
pact of changes in the structure of European economies from high to low labour
share sectors, and found that the share-shift fails to explain most of the decline in
labour share. This suggests that technological improvements have been the under-
lying factor behind the general decline in labour share.
Some authors, taking an ideological stance, also argue that technological change
is associated with capitalism and may even strengthen the tendencies of a capital-
ist system to reduce the overall labour share income. For example, Bengtsson and
Ryner (2014) relate the falling wage share with the neoliberal transnational class
rule that has restricted the power of trade unions, rendering increasingly relational
power resources ineffective.
Several undesirable effects of the decline in the labour share have been iden-
tified in the literature. The main implication of the falling labour share relates to
income inequality between those who offer the services in the form of labour and
those whose contribution relates mostly to ownership (Karanassou and Sala, 2013;
Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2010). This need not translate into a situation where
all workers become relatively poorer and all capitalists become richer. Some highly
skilled and highly educated workers may actually have enjoyed an increasing in-
come share (IMF, 2007; Autor et al., 2006). In addition, self-employed persons
are themselves owners of enterprises, so that while their income share as labour
providers of labour may have declined, their income share as owners may have in-
creased. If wage earners are taken collectively, however, as previously indicated,
their share has been observed to have decreased over time in many countries.4
It needs to be emphasised, however, that inequality depends on other factors,
such as the distribution of capital income and the degree of tax progression, keep-
ing the labour share constant. For example, a concentrated distribution of capital
income and progressive taxation are anticipated to keep a relatively flat income dis-
tribution. Further, faced with an aging population, capital shares are expected to in-
crease to insure retirees to be equally well-off (Thøgersen, 2015). Consequently, as
capital share of income rises, so should productivity and wages that should at least
partially compensate for the decline in labour share. On the other hand, Piketty and
Zucman (2014) foresee an increase in the share of wealth going to the top of the
distribution, due to international competition of capital and slower population and
productivity growth. The overall effects will remain unclear and we cannot draw
any hard and fast conclusions on this subject.
The falling labour share may also lead to a decrease in aggregate demand due
to, among other things, the possibility that high income households have a lower
propensity to consume than lower income households.5 Its impact on economic
growth, however, is not so straightforward. Whether a decrease in labour share
creates shortfalls in aggregate demand depends on whether aggregate demand is
38 Journal of Income Distribution
wage-led or profit-led. Onaran and Galanis (2012) examine this issue and conclude
that there are two opposing forces involved, namely: (i) as labour share decreases,
propensity to consume declines; (ii) but as the labour costs decrease, this is counter-
balanced by an increase in profit rates that could possibly increase investment and
improve competitiveness. On the other hand, the falling labour share could result
in weaker purchasing power of a large proportion of the population.6 Neverthe-
less, the decline in consumption is ambiguous depending on the set of assumptions
adopted and the groups of households considered.
The declining share of labour income may also possibly lead to social unrest
(Curci et al., 2011). It should be recalled that the effect of incomes on satisfaction
does not generally depend on their absolute value but on their relative value, so
even if labour income increases in absolute terms, a fall in the labour share may
lead to social dissatisfaction.7
The purpose of this article is to test the hypothesis that the labour share may
have been secularly declining mostly due to technological advance, and that own-
ers, rather than employees, appropriated the resulting returns. Thus, the focus of
the article will be on the EU Member States.
The article is organised as follows. Following the introduction, the first section
shows that wages rose at a slower rate than labour productivity in the EU, a ten-
dency that contributed to the falling income share and which may have been caused
by technological progress. The second section econometrically tests the premise
that technological change influences labour demand in the EU Member States, and
it also negatively affects the labour share income. For this purpose, we use a labour
demand equation derived from the CES production function. The final section con-
cludes the paper with a number of implications relating to the econometric results.
The Falling Labour Share on the EU Over Time
The measurement debate
Simply defined, the labour income share in a given country is the compensation
to those offering labour services divided by the total value added in that country.
Measuring the labour income share, however, is not straightforwardly done by mul-
tiplying the number of employees by the average wage rates and dividing by GDP.
Sweeny (2013), Stockhammer (2012) and Gomme and Rupert (2004) discuss a
number of problems encountered when measuring the labour income share, which
include the well-known difficulties of correctly measuring gross value added, in-
cluding understatement of incomes for tax evasion and tax avoidance purposes.
There are additional problems relating to such issues as to whether depreciation
and pension income should be included.
Another issue creating measurement problems is that the labour share ought
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to include the labour services offered by self-employed persons. In many stud-
ies it is assumed that self-employed persons earn the same average earnings as
hired employees. This assumption would not be correct if the distribution of the
self-employed is different from that of the hired employees. For example, if there
are proportionately more self-employed professionals (lawyers, doctors, etc.) and
traders than is the case with hired employment, then income per person could con-
ceptually be higher on average among the self-employed persons when compared
to hired employees. On the other hand, if the self-employed persons include a
larger proportion of small farmers, the share of the self-employed could concep-
tually be lower when compared to that of hired employees. Some authors try to
correct for such distributional differences by imputing it from wage and salary data
at the sectoral level (Askenazy, 2003) or from survey data (Freeman, 2011a,b).
Labour income share for self-occupied persons cannot be easily inferred, and
national accounts record self-employed labour and capital income together. Krueger
(1999) explains that isolating the component of self-employment income that ac-
crues to labour is ambivalent. Pugsely (2012) argues that there is substantial under-
reporting of self-employment income in surveys, while Elsby et al. (2013) discuss
practical caveats to capture the mixture of labour and capital income of the self-
employed. Refining the assumption to impute the self-employment income that
accrues to labour, however, does not change the evaluation of the labour share
(Freeman, 2011), nor does the under-reporting of self-employment income (Hurst,
Li and Pugsley, 2012). This study takes the usual approach, as adopted by the
OECD, the US Bureau of Labour Statistics and the EU AMECO, assuming that
wage rates of employees and the self-employed are the same, and adjusts the wage
share accordingly.89
The labour share in the EU since 1995
The labour income share differs between the EU Member States, but there is a
common feature in this regard, namely that their labour share has been generally
declining over time, as can be seen in Table 1, which presents relevant data for EU
Member States for the 18-year period between 1995 and 2012. Between 1995 and
2007, labour share has decreased for 18 countries, increased for 8 countries and
stayed equal for 1 country. We observed the largest declines in Poland, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, and Austria, while we observed noticeable improvements in Lithuania,
Czech Republic, Denmark, and Sweden.
Looking at the EU as a whole, in recent years there were short term upswings
in the labour share during the economic showdown of the early 2000s and during
the post-2008 economic crisis period, as illustrated in Figure 1.10 One possible
explanation is that a counter-cyclical change in the labour share has been observed
(European Commission, 2007; Hansen and Prescott, 2005). Indeed, employers
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tend to maintain employment when there is a reduction in output due to the costs
of hiring-and-firing. As a result, the labour share increases at the expense of the
capital share. The opposite happens during a recovery, such that employment would
increase less-than-proportionately relative to output.
Nevertheless, the secular trend shows a clear decline. This is demonstrated
by estimating a linear time trend of labour share levels across time via using the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The estimates show that the labour share in
the majority of member states of the EU has a negative time trend. Some countries
— Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Malta, Sweden, and the United Kingdom —
registered inconclusive trends when taking into consideration both pre- and post-
crisis periods. Overall, in the EU as a whole, declining labour share trends were
found in both EU27 and EU15.
Figure 1
The share of labour income in the EU27 and EU15 since 1995
Source: AMECO
Compensation of employees, productivity, and the labour income share
If it is assumed that the labour share is measured by WL/Y , where W is the wage
rate, L stands for persons employed and Y for GDP, then the labour share would
remain constant if W increases by the same proportion as the output/labour ratio,
Y/L. If W increases at a slower rate than the ratio Y/L (or faster than the L/Y ratio),
then the end result will be a decrease in the labour share, and vice-versa.
The growth rate for W and Y/L was calculated through the equation Xt = Xoert ,
where X denotes the dependent variable (W or Y/L) and ert is a time trend, which
takes values of 1, 2, 3, . . . T . The equation becomes linear if transformed into
natural logs and, using OLS, an estimate of r (the growth rate) can be obtained.
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Table 1
The share of labour income in the EU member states since 1995
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An estimate of the growth in the wage rates (W ) compared to the growth in the
output/labour ratio (Y/L) for the period 1995 to 2012, shown in Table 2, indicates
that in most of the EU-27 Members States, W rose at a slower rate than the Y/L
ratio, explaining, albeit mathematically, the fall in the labour share during this pe-
riod. This could possibly indicate, but does not prove, that the effect of technology
may have increased output faster than labour, leading to a wage/productivity gap
and therefore to a decrease in the labour share.
Table 2
Average Annual Growth in Compensation per Employee, and GDP per Person Employed,
1995–2012
(a) GDP (b) Capital (c) Compensation (d) GDP
Income per Employee per Person Employed
Austria 3.42% 4.13% 1.94% 2.47%
Belgium 3.68% 3.73% 2.48% 2.67%
Bulgaria 9.88% 10.10% 9.35% 9.51%
Cyprus 5.55% 4.84% 3.65% 3.57%*
Czech Republic 8.07% 7.83% 8.60% 7.97%*
Denmark 3.46% 2.67% 3.43% 3.09%*
Estonia 10.33% 10.49% 10.39% 10.47%
Finland 3.94% 3.44% 3.01% 2.74%*
France 3.36% 3.18% 2.60% 2.55%*
Germany 1.89% 2.45% 1.06% 1.39%
Greece 5.03% 4.81% 3.83% 4.30%
Hungary 6.92% 6.79% 6.39% 6.87%
Ireland 6.86% 6.71% 4.40% 4.51%
Italy 3.14% 2.76% 2.32% 2.25%*
Latvia 10.68% 10.87% 10.45% 11.12%
Lithuania 10.48% 10.17% 10.64% 11.15%
Luxembourg 6.45% 6.42% 2.89% 3.03%
Malta 4.73% 4.75% 3.86% 3.83%*
Netherlands 4.01% 4.00% 2.87% 2.96%
Poland 7.35% 8.13% 5.44% 7.06%
Portugal 3.77% 3.47% 3.40% 3.49%
Romania 10.54% 10.35% 11.57% 12.37%
Slovakia 10.24% 10.90% 9.68% 9.89%
Slovenia 5.40% 5.71% 4.61% 4.91%
Spain 5.58% 5.75% 2.89% 3.42%
Sweden 3.44% 3.06% 2.83% 2.71%*
United Kingdom 3.51% 3.20% 2.99% 2.74%*
EU-27 3.59% 3.70% 2.65% 2.93%
EU-15 3.31% 3.33% 2.29% 2.41%
There are other factors that could possibly influence the labour share of EU-27.
Indeed, the direction of labour share also depends on the magnitude of the elas-
ticity of substitution between labour and capital, which measures the responsive-
ness of a percentage change in factor proportions brought about by a proportionate
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change in their relative prices, holding total output constant. Indeed, if the elastic-
ity of substitution is larger than unity, an increase in wage rate is likely to induce
firms to substitute labour for capital more-than-proportionately and consequently
reduce the labour income share. Globalisation could also be another force that
exerts downward pressures on the labour share income for capital-abundant coun-
tries, provided that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is less
than unity. Another factor that should be mentioned is labour market institutions,
such as industrial and employment relations legislations, which may determine the
bargaining power of labour. For example, flexible regulations may act as a dis-
incentive to work, make informal work more attractive, and hence mitigate the
bargaining power of labour. In the next section we shall use cross-section data per-
taining to EU Member States to test whether the labour share has been influenced
by technological change.
Technological Advance and the Labour Share
This section tests the hypothesis that technological change has negatively affected
the falling labour share in the EU. The approach adopted in this section is to es-
timate a labour demand equation, derived from a production function. The result
could shed light on the effect of technology on labour demand, everything else re-
maining constant, and in turn this would have implications on the labour income
share, as explained below.
The Production Function
The basic assumption underlying a production function is that output depends on
labour and capital, given the state of technology. The variable representing capital
is often difficult to measure, and data on this variable are generally not readily avail-
able (Dean, 1964). In addition, there is the problem of measuring capital utilisation.
One way of circumventing this problem is by deriving and using the marginal pro-
ductivity condition derived from the production function, which is the approach
adopted in this study. The underlying production function that will be utilised is of
the CES type introduced by Arrow et al., (1961),11 allowing for the possibility of
efficiency changes and non-constant returns to scale as shown in Equation 1:
Yit = A
χ
it
[
bL−ρit +(1−b)K−ρit
]−ν/ρ
(1)
where Yit represents value-added produced by the inputs, namely labour (Lit) and
capital (Kit) for each of the 26 countries over 5 years. The subscript i, takes a
value of 1, 2, . . . 26 and the subscript refers to the t takes a value of 1, 2, . . . 5.
The expression Aχit captures shifts in the production function, due to technological
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differences between countries,12 which could influence employment even if wage
rates and output do not vary between the countries concerned. When the function
is based on time series data, the expression is often represented by a time trend ert
where r is the rate of growth of Yi as a result of technological advance, with wage
rate and output remaining constant, and t is time, taking the value of 1, 2, . . . T . In
the present specification shown as Equation 1, the change is across countries so the
exponent χ captures the effect of technological differences across countries.13
The coefficients of Equation 1 can be interpreted as follows:
• b is related to the distribution of income;
• ρ is related to the elasticity of substitution (σ ) which is equal to 1/(1+ρ). In
the Cobb-Douglas production function, the value of σ is restricted to unity,
implying that ρ takes a value of zero. By using the CES production func-
tion, we are implicitly allowing for the possibility that a certain percentage
decrease in factor prices need not generate a corresponding percentage in-
crease in factor demand;
• ν is the homogeneity parameter, which measures the degree of returns to
scale. It would indicate constant returns if its value is unity, decreasing re-
turns if its value is a positive fraction and increasing returns if its value is
higher than unity.
• χ captures the effect of technological differences between countries on out-
put.
Deriving a labour demand equation
The labour demand equation can be derived by first specifying the marginal produc-
tivity condition, and assuming, as is the standard done in economic theory, that the
marginal product of labour is equal to the wage rate (W ) as shown in Equation 2:
MPL = ∂Yit/∂Lit =W (2)
Applying this condition to Equation 1, we obtain:
∂Yit/∂Lit = νbA
χ(−ρ/ν)
it L
−(1+ρ)
it Y
(1+ρ/ν)
it (3)
Combining Equations 2 and 3, re-arranging, and expressing the resultant equation
in log form, we obtain the following equation:
lnLit = σ · ln(νb)−σ · lnWit +[1+σ(ν−1)]/ν · lnYit − (1−σ)/ν ·χlnAit (4)
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where σ = 1/(1+ ρ), which can be interpreted as representing the elasticity of
substitution between labour and capital. Equation 4 can therefore be expressed as
follows for estimation purposes:
lnLit = α0+α1lnWit +α2lnYit +α3lnAit (5)
where the coefficients have a number of interesting properties, namely:
• α1 takes a value of −σ , that is, the elasticity of substitution with a negative
sign, indicating the extent to which labour responds to a change in wage
rates.
• α2 represents the elasticity of employment with respect to output. This co-
efficient will, under certain conditions, take a value of a positive fraction if
increasing returns to scale are assumed.
• α3 captures the effect of technological differences on labour demand. It is
expected to have a negative sign, indicating that with technological advance,
the number of employees per unit of output would decrease.
It should be noted that the coefficient on ln Yi
α2 = [1+σ(ν−1)]/ν (6)
which means that the labour demand elasticity with respect to output is not uniquely
related to ν but also to σ . It can be shown that ν = (1−σ)/(α2−σ), so that if α2 is
a positive fraction (0 < α2 < 1), ν would be higher than unity, implying increasing
returns to scale.
It should also be noted that the coefficient on ln Ait
α3 = (1−σ)/ν ·χ (7)
which means that effect of technological change on labour demand is influenced by
the elasticity of substitution and by returns to scale.
Notice also that technology’s effect is unbiased in that it affects labour and
capital equally. There is considerable debate on the matter relating to biased and
unbiased technological progress, but allowing for this would have introduced un-
necessary complications in the estimation procedure. The question arises therefore
as to whether technology also affects the share of capital. Given the stronger deci-
sion power of capital owners, when compared to labour, it is likely that capital will
enjoy most of the gains from technology.
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Estimating the labour demand equation
With reference to Equation 5, a priori, one expects that α2 takes a negative sign,
α3 a positive sign, and α4 a negative sign, given that the labour demand function is
assumed to be derived from the production function.
We investigate labour demand in the private sector14 for a cross-section of EU-
27 countries utilising annual data on total hours worked (L), wage rates (W ), and
gross value added (Y ) with data over the period of five years (2008 to 2012). The
data is mostly sourced from the EUROSTAT database (see data appendix). Tech-
nology (A) is sourced from Pillar 9a of the Global Competitiveness Report (Tech-
nological Adoption) and defined as (i) the availability of latest technologies (com-
ponent index 9.01) and (ii) FDI and technology transfer (component index 9.03).
All variables are measured in natural logs as indicated in Equation 5.
The choice of 26 countries was conditioned by EU Membership up to 2012,
which enjoys the benefit of availability, reliability, and comparability of data.15
Estimation Results
Equation 5 was estimated using the panel data approach and the random effects
method. This estimation technique was taken into consideration to control for time-
specific effects. Alternative specifications are provided in the Appendix.
It was estimated first by assuming that all observations of employment indicate
labour demand, which means that the labour market in all countries was charac-
terised by equilibrium or excess labour supply. From the available data, the estima-
tion results are as follows:
ln Lit = 3.349 - 0.770 ln Wit + 0.968 ln Yit - 0.668 ln Ait
(16.317) (-37.679) (128.275) (-5.481)
N = 130 R2 = 0.993 Adj R2 = 0.993
(8)
The estimated parameters are in line with a priori expectations and have plau-
sible magnitudes. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated t-values and indi-
cate that the estimates are statistically different from zero at the 95 percent level,
whereas the correlation coefficient is on the high side.
The estimated equation shows that the coefficient of W takes a value of−0.770,
indicating that a 10% increase in wage rate generates a decrease in employment of
7.70%, everything else remaining constant. As alluded to earlier, this is an estimate
of the elasticity of substitution which is less than unity, justifying the use of the CES
production function rather than the Cobb-Douglas one. This parameter has impor-
tant implications, since its magnitude provides an insight into the labour/output
ratio changes as the countries’ wage rates change.
The estimated parameter α2, that is, the coefficient on output, takes a value of
0.968. This would seem to suggest that as the private sector expands, the cost per
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unit of output decreases, since the coefficient on Y implies that there are increasing
returns to scale, as indicated by the parameter ν in the underlying CES production,
which as a result takes a value of value of 1.16. In other words, the value of ν
shows increasing returns to scale, meaning that a given increases in inputs generate
a more-than-proportionate increases in output. A t-statistic test on the coefficient
of Y indicates that it is statistically lower than unity at the 95 percent level of signif-
icance.16 The returns to scale parameter has important implications for the size of
countries. It confirms that larger countries, which employ more labour and capital,
are able to enjoy increasing returns to scale. This is in line with the hypothesis that
larger countries have a cost advantage over smaller size economies.17
The estimated coefficient for technological change is in line with theoretical
expectations. The result shown would seem to suggest that, as expected, techno-
logical progress across countries leads to a reduction in labour demand, other things
remaining constant. The way the index is constructed implies that the percentage
difference between the highest and lowest is 1.45% so, keeping everything else
constant, a 1% improvement in technology between the technological leader and
technological laggards would give rise to less than 1% decrease in labour demand.
Equation 8 can be rearranged so as to have the labour income share (LS =
LW/Y ) as the dependent variable by multiplying both sides of the equation by W
and dividing both sides by Y as follows:
ln Lit = 3.349 + 0.230 ln Wit - 0.032 ln Yit - 0.668 ln Ait
(16.317) (11.274) (-4.290) (-5.481)
N = 130 R2 = 0.523 Adj R2 = 0.511
(9)
The estimated parameters confirm that the labour income share (LS) is negatively
affected by technological change across European countries, as indicated by the
coefficient on A. In addition, the estimated coefficient on W confirms that the elas-
ticity of substitution between labour and capital is relatively inelastic, implying that
an increase in wage rates is unlikely to induce firms to substitute labour for capital
more-than-proportionately and therefore increases the labour share, everything else
remaining constant. The parameter on output is, as expected, negative. This means
that an increase in output implies a decrease in the labour share, everything else left
unchanged.18
Existence of excess demand and segmenting the sample
In the real world, wage rates may not clear the market in all periods. If excess
demand for labour exist, employment would not measure labour demand, given
that in such a case, unfilled job vacancies, which are part of labour demand, would
not be included.
An approach to take into account labour market disequilibrium is by assuming
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that employment represents labour demand only when excess demand is absent,
that is when the rate of unemployment is equal or higher than what is known as
the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) or natural rate of
unemployment (NRU)19 during the 2008–2012 period.
For this purpose the labour demand equation was re-estimated by excluding
those countries characterised by excess labour demand, assuming that those coun-
tries with an unemployment rate lower than NAIRU were characterised by excess
labour demand. Based on the data on NAIRU20 four countries were found to be
characterised by excess demand, and were therefore excluded from the sample.21
The estimation results of this approach are as follows:
ln Lit = 3.143 - 0.789 ln Wit + 0.965 ln Yit - 0.507 ln Ait
(14.806) (-35.701) (113.164) (-4.112)
N = 110 R2 = 0.993 Adj R2 = 0.993
(10)
where L, W , Y , and A have the same meaning as before.
In Equation 10 all estimates agree with a priori expectations in terms of signs
and have plausible magnitudes. Again, the t-statistics pertaining to W , Y , and A
indicate that the parameters are statistically different from zero, and the coefficient
on Y is statistically different from unity, at the 95 percent level.22
Repeating the procedure for Equation 9 the results again indicate that techno-
logical advance negatively affects the labour income share, after controlling for W
and Y :23
ln Lit = 3.143 - 0.211 ln Wit + 0.035 ln Yit - 0.507 ln Ait
(14.806) (9.537) (-4.062) (-4.112)
N = 110 R2 = 0.501 Adj R2 = 0.487
(11)
Residual diagnostic tests
It should be noted that both equations performed satisfactorily in terms of resid-
ual diagnostic tests, for which we used the Jarque-Bera tests, which showed that
the residuals are normally distributed, at 95 percentconfidence interval respec-
tively. Furthermore, to control for heteroscedasticity, the parameters were also
estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimators, showing that the standard
errors remained practically unchanged. Regarding multicollinearity, the correlation
between W , Y and A across countries was not found to be unduly high.24 Two diag-
nostic tests were also conducted to test for the random effects method. The results
of the Hausman test decisively favours the use of the RE estimator over fixed-effects
in this analysis, while the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test prefers RE over
the simple OLS regression.
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Conclusion
This article argued that technological advance has a negative effect on the labour
income share, mainly due to its capital augmenting effects, and the asymmetric
power over the distribution of income. In turn, this reduces the labour share in-
come. This hypothesis was tested using a production function approach, utilising
the marginal productivity condition for labour derived from the CES production
function. The results indicate, among other things, that technological progress
negatively affects labour demand, everything else remaining constant. This con-
clusion was extended to explain why technological advance also negatively affects
the labour share. Therefore, as countries experience improvements in technology,
lower labour share income is experienced when compared to countries with lower
levels of technology.
This finding has important implications for EU member states, namely that
countries with higher levels of technology would tend to experience higher income
inequalities and the consequent negative effects, discussed above, when compared
to countries with a lower level of technology, everything else remaining constant.
The article also argued that the adverse effects of a declining labour income
share are generally not blamed on the workers themselves but on factors outside
their control, including technological advance and a higher degree of decision mak-
ing enjoyed by the owners of capital when compared to hired labour. This suggests
that some form of policy intervention would seem to be necessary as left to its own
devices, the capitalist system — which has often led to asymmetrical power over the
income share between owners and employees and has ushered in the globalisation
process — has generated technological advance that could result in a continuing
secular falling labour share income.
One should not imply from this finding that policies aimed at dismantling tech-
nological advance and banning labour-saving devices would solve the problem, as
this will result in a loss of competitiveness and productivity, and will be counter-
productive. As Bernanke (2007) argues, policy approaches that would inhibit the
dynamism and flexibility of the labour market would do more harm than good as
technological advance is a critical source of overall economic growth and of im-
provements in the overall standard of living. It should be noted however, that the
effect of technology will depend on the workings of the labour market. If, for ex-
ample, labour-saving technology leads to loss of job in one industry, job mobility
could mitigate this problem as those who lose their jobs could relocate into other
industries
One form of policy intervention is progressive income tax to redress this prob-
lem. Atkinson et al. (2009), for example, make a case for progressive income
tax to redistribute income to labour earnings and from capital earnings which have
grown at an unprecedented rate since the 1970s.25 Progressivity of income tax
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could be strengthened by cutting back tax relief that benefit mainly high-income
groups (OECD, 2012), such as reduced taxation on capital gains. Income tax pro-
gressivity, however has various downsides in that it could discourage effort, as well
as research and innovation, which are the drivers of technological advance, and
could stimulate outflow of capital in search of lower rates of taxation.
One of the factors leading to lower earnings relate to skill mismatches which
arise with the changing structure of the economy, often driven by technological ad-
vance. In this regard, another form of policy intervention in mitigating the adverse
effects of a declining labour share is the activation of active labour market policies
(OECD, 2012; Bernanke, 2007), which tend to reduce market frictions. Improving
skills and labour mobility are vital to counteract the effect of technological advance
(Baumol and Wolff, 1998). Indeed, skilled workers and those with a good level of
education are better able to respond to changing circumstances in the labour market
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001)
As explained above, labour replacing technology could lead to GDP growing
faster than wage rates, and this could in turn lead to chronically high unemployment
rates. Brynjolfsson and Mcafee (2012) consider the rapid technological advance as
destabilising, as the jobs that being displaced by technology may be lost for good,
leading to long term unemployment.26 This would be harmful to society given that
gainful employment has dignity associated with it and that unemployment leads to
a number of social ills.
Some economists (e.g. Coote and Franklin, 2013) consider that a shorter work-
ing week, without a reduction in pay, could reduce this tendency. In addition, ac-
cording to the same authors, a shorter working week would lead to a healthier, more
fulfilling and sustainable way of life.27 A similar argument is also put forward by
Kallis et al (2013) who conclude that while the results of reducing working hours
are uncertain, this may be a risk worth taking, especially as an interim measure that
may relieve unemployment while other necessary structural changes are instituted.
Such a measure would of course lead to higher costs for firms, who would have
to employ more persons to produce the same level of output, everything else re-
maining constant. On the other hand, if the reduced man-hours do not produce a
lower level of output28 this measure would be counter-productive in that it will not
increase labour demand.
In summary, the finding of negative effect of technology advance on labour
share, as evidenced by the results of the labour demand equation, is plausible, and
confirms the tested hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that other factors are
likely to affect the labour income share, such as globalisation process and structural
shifts. These could also have had some effects on the labour share, however, they
might have been captured in the technology variable, given that exposure to the
globalisation process and structural shifts may have themselves conditioned tech-
nological changes.
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Appendix A
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Table A2
Hourly Wages and Salaries and Technology
Hourly Wages and Salaries Technology
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 23.9 24.8 25.6 26.3 27.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9
Bulgaria 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.3
Czech Republic 6.7 6.7 7.1 7.6 7.7 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4
Denmark 30.2 31.1 32.1 32.7 33.3 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.5
Germany 21.8 22.3 22.4 23.0 23.8 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.4
Estonia 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.8 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.5
Ireland 24.8 25.2 24.9 25.0 25.1 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.2
Greece 13.5 13.7 13.7 13.1 12.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.6
Spain 14.3 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4
France 20.9 21.1 21.7 22.3 22.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.5
Italy 18.2 18.8 19.4 19.6 19.9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4
Cyprus 14.1 14.6 14.8 15.1 15.0 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.1
Latvia 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7
Lithuania 4.2 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.9 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.4
Luxembourg 26.6 27.8 28.5 29.4 30.0 5.8 6.0 5.9 5.8 6.0
Hungary 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.3
Malta 10.4 10.6 10.9 11.2 11.5 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7
Netherlands 22.9 23.5 23.9 24.2 24.5 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.8
Austria 19.5 20.3 20.6 21.3 22.4 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.6
Poland 6.3 5.4 6.0 6.1 6.2 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7
Portugal 9.9 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.7
Romania 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.2
Slovenia 11.6 12.2 12.4 12.6 12.7 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.8
Slovakia 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.3
Finland 20.9 21.9 22.4 23.0 24.0 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.5
Sweden 21.2 19.7 22.5 24.3 26.0 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 5.9
United Kingdom 17.7 16.0 17.0 17.1 18.3 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8
Note on the data. The units of measurement are: gross value added in euro million.
Table A3
Correlation Matrix - 2008
L Y W A
L 1.00
Y 0.95 1.00
W 0.18 0.36 1.00
T -0.02 0.15 0.65 1.00
Table A4
Correlation Matrix - 2009
L Y W A
L 1.00
Y 0.95 1.00
W 0.16 0.35 1.00
T -0.07 0.08 0.63 1.00
Table A5
Correlation Matrix - 2010
L Y W A
L 1.00
Y 0.95 1.00
W 0.17 0.35 1.00
T -0.06 0.08 0.57 1.00
Table A6
Correlation Matrix - 2011
L Y W A
L 1.00
Y 0.95 1.00
W 0.17 0.35 1.00
T -0.10 0.05 0.56 1.00
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Table A7
Correlation Matrix - 2012
L Y W A
L 1.00
Y 0.95 1.00
W 0.17 0.35 1.00
T -0.09 0.07 0.59 1.00
Appendix B: The data
The data used for estimating Equation 7 refer to average period between 2008 and
2012. The definition and the sources of the data are as follows:
Total Hours Worked (L)
Definition: Total average number of actual annual hours of work, in private sector.
Source: Labour Force Survey
The data on employment was multiplied by average number of weekly hours of
work. URL for employment: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=
lfsa_egan2&lang=en, extracted on 23-April-2014
URL for average number of usual weekly hours of work: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_egan2&lang=en, extracted on 13-April-2014
Wage Rates (W )
Definition: Hourly wages and salaries in cash and in kind borne by employers for
the purpose of employing staff, in industry, construction and services (except pub-
lic administration, defence, and compulsory social security).
Source: Labour Cost Survey
URL for wage rates: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lc_
lci_lev&lang=en, extracted on 23-April-2014
Gross Value Added (Y )
Definition: Output is measured at basic prices, in private sector.
Source: National Accounts
URL for output: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_nace21_
c&lang=en, extracted on 23-April-2014
Technology (A)
Definition: Average of two indices namely (i) availability of latest technologies
(component index 9.01) and (ii) FDI and technology transfer (component index
9.03) of the Global Competiveness Report (Various Issues).
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Appendix C: Estimation Techniques
Table C1
Estimating labour demand assuming equilibrium condition
RE FE Pooled OLS OLS
(5-year average)
C 3.349 3.352 3.349 3.451
(16.317) (16.316) (16.273) (4.575)
ln Wit -0.77 -0.768 -0.77 -0.843
(-37.679) (-37.584) (-37.580) (-11.945)
ln Yit 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.995
(128.275) (128.251) (127.935) (37.516)
ln Ait -0.668 -0.672 -0.668 -0.832
(-5.481) (-5.506) (-5.466) (-1.925)
R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.986
Adj R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.985
F-stat 6107 2631 6107 532
N 130 130 130 26
Table C2
Estimating labour demand assuming disequilibrium condition
RE FE Pooled OLS OLS
(5-year average)
C 3.143 3.136 3.143 3.286
(14.806) (14.754) (14.801) (7.268)
ln Wit -0.789 -0.789 -0.789 -0.782
(-35.701) (-35.658) (-35.690) (-16.665)
ln Yit 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.962
(113.164) (113.144) (113.127) (51.532)
ln Ait -0.507 -0.504 -0.507 -0.582
(-4.112) (-4.084) (-4.110) (-2.287)
R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.994
Adj R2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993
F-stat 4960 2127 4960 1060
N 110 110 110 22
Notes
1Technological changes could be attributed to the development in information and communications technology
(ICT), a development which is considered by Blinder (2006) as the third industrial revolution.
2A review of the literature on the share of labour is given in Schneider (2011).
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3Contribution of emerging countries can be associated with globalisation through trade, inward FDI, and
international migration. This process is associated with the spread of technological advance and also with a
deteriorating bargaining power of hired employees.
4As Jacobson and Occhino (2012) argue, labour income is more evenly distributed across households than
capital income. The decline in labour share resulted in total income being less evenly distributed and more
concentrated at the top of the distribution. Therefore, this contributed to increase income inequality.
5Dynan et al. (2004) show that the rich do save more, while Kwak (2014), referring to this possibility, argues
that there is a strong argument to be made that a capitalist society needs systematic redistribution to survive.
6Curci et al. (2011) also put forward this argument, and contend that arresting the decline in the wage share
can help put recovery from the global economic crisis on a more sustainable path. A comprehensive income-
generating strategy would have expansionary effects on aggregate demand and employment, without aggravating
fiscal deficits.
7Rodrik (1999) equates income inequality with social conflict, and conducts a series of quantitative tests to
show that income inequality impedes the social harmony required to sustain economic growth. The connection
between income inequality and social well-being is also discussed in Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), who show that
population health tends to be better in societies where income is more equally distributed. They refer to recent
evidence that suggests that many other social problems, including mental illness, violence, imprisonment, lack
of trust, teenage births, obesity, drug abuse, and poor educational performance of schoolchildren, are also more
common in more unequal societies.
8On this issue see the definition adopted by the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/std/productivity-stats/40284233.
pdf) and the Bureau of Labour Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/prod2.pdf)
9This index is readily available in the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (DG ECFIN) AMECO database. This indicator assumes that the self-employed earn the same average
earnings as employees by adjusting the labour share and by taking compensation per employee as percentage of
GDP at factor cost per person employed. GDP at factor cost is GDP at market prices minus taxes on production and
imports plus subsidies. In national accounts it is equal to the aggregation of labour compensation and operating
surplus.
10EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom while EU-27 includes EU-15 and new Member
States’ economies, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The addition of new Member States does not alter the overall trend of
EU-15 in a significant way due to the relative small share of their economies.
11A discussion on the properties of the CES is presented in Miller (2008).
12Technology measures shifts in production function that cannot be explained through labour or capital changes.
In this sense, Aχit captures any systematic factor other than labour and capital.
13When time-series data are used, the efficiency term of the production function is often interpreted as capturing
Hicks-neutral technological change. Alternatively, one can allow for a non-neutral type of technological change
(David and Van de Klundert, 1965), in the sense that the factor augmenting efficiency changes are not assumed to
be the same for labour and capital. Although the technical change parameter is usually applied to time-series data,
we shall use the concept of efficiency in our cross-section analysis to allow for shifts in the production function
due to differing factor enhancing endowments across countries.
14Private sector is defined as total activities less public administration, defence and compulsory social security.
15Luxembourg was omitted from the regression analysis as it was an extreme outlier. Luxembourg had an
unexceptionally large output-to-labour ratio because of a high net number of cross-border workers. Therefore,
estimation of Equation 5 gave a large standardised residual for Luxembourg. It is important to outline that national
accounts employment data for industry is not available in hours worked, thus this study had to rely on Labour
Force Survey data.
16On the basis of the computed t-value (4.29), we reject the null hypothesis that α2 is equal to 1.
17On this issue see Briguglio and Vella (2015).
18The labour market institutions could also be factored in by augmenting Equation 5 with the tax wedge,
sourced from the Tax and Benefits Indicators Database of the European Commission. This tests the hypothesis
that the higher the tax wedge the higher is the disincentive to work, thereby affecting the bargaining process of
employees. The results of estimation gave practically the same results as those obtained by regressing Equation
8, meaning that the coefficient on A remains significantly negative.
19NAIRU or NRU both refer to a rate of unemployment compatible with labour market equilibrium.
20The data on NAIRU was obtained from the annual macroeconomic database (AMECO) of the European
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN)
21The countries with excess labour demand are Germany, Poland, Cyprus, and Slovakia.
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22On the basis of the computed t-value (4.06), we reject the null hypothesis that α2 is equal to 1.
23Alternative approaches were to use the value of A and an index for ranking countries according to the absolute
value of A which gave similar results.
24From the correlation coefficients it can be concluded that exogenous variables are not highly collinear. This
means that multicollinearity is inconsequential.
25This was one factor identified in Piketty (2014).
26Keynes (1930) wrote that within his own lifetime “we may be able to perform all the operations of agriculture,
mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been accustomed.”
27This argument can be articulated in a Marxist discourse as to who is to appropriate the fruits of technological
advance, that is, whether employees should do this by enjoying more leisure at the expense of profit, or whether
owners of capital should do this by increasing their profit.
28This could happen if employees adjust their work speed so as to fill the time available for the work’s comple-
tion in line with Parkinson’s Law.
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